Introduction
The financial crisis of 2008 sent shock waves through social, political and economic domains, shaping massively complex globalised processes of public service assemblage (Deleuze and Guatari 2004b, a) . In developed economies with high levels of debt, one effect has been the widespread adoption of central government strategies of fiscal constraint or 'austerity' with respect to public services (Clarke and Newman 2012). The From this perspective, to name an apparatus (for example, a local authority area's youth service) or delineate a population of organisations (for example 'youth organisations') is to say less about the abiding qualities of something, and more about what a productive process has done in making and sustaining that thing as it is. Equally, a discontinuity such as the end of youth services describes the productive forces at play, albeit forces of a different quality and effect. 'Assemblage' refers to all of this this scene at once; it is a means of 'thinking structure as well as multiplicity and indeterminacy' (Venn 2006, 107) simultaneously.
Assemblage gives the notion of a 'neoliberal regime' a particular meaning, referring us specifically to the quality of the productive forces of neoliberal government.
Ball, following Foucault, has described neoliberalism as a specific modality of government that relates truth, power and the subject through the constitution of a 'discursive field within which the exercise of power is "rationalised"' (Ball 2013 loc. 1688). Conceptualised in this way, 'neoliberalism' refers to constitution of a regulatory force through the investment of complex apparatuses of institutions, practices, norms, knowledges, and subjects, in a techno-ethical process of subjectivation conducive to capitalism. The neoliberal 'regime' connotes the sense in which the productivity of this 'tangle' (Deleuze 1992, 159) of machines is subject to a certain regulation; the effect of giving complex, machinic assemblage a 'trajectory' (ibid.), sketching its lines in realtime.
To distinguish a phase of late neoliberalism or refer to a 'late neoliberal regime' is, then, not to claim a fundamental break with neoliberalism as a modality of government or its relation to capital. Late neoliberalism continues to involve the extension of market forms in domains of the public, civic, culture and subjectivity. Late neoliberalism is a distinction within the neoliberal regime of power, rather than a distinction from it, based on relatively general changes in how neoliberalism works to sustain itself. That distinctiveness can be understood in terms of the changing competence of certain 'lines of force' which effect the trajectory of complex public service apparatuses. And, as noted by Ball, this is the kind of change that has happened before in the UK since the late 1970s and is marked again by 'austerity' (Ball 2012b).
Specifically, late neoliberalism refers to the growing effectiveness of finance capital imaginaries as distinct from productive capital imaginaries, in conditioning the trajectories of public service reform (McGimpsey 2017) . Quasi-marketisation dominated recent decades of neoliberal reform of education (West and Pennell 2002 , Le Grand 2001 , Whitty 1997 , based on a productive capital imaginary of the factory for the production of commodities, and the circulation of commodities through the market place of buyers and sellers. Late neoliberalism describes a situation in which a finance capital imaginary is increasingly effective in reform, whereby 'investors' trade in a futures market to realise a 'return'. This is, of course, not to claim finance capital is 'new' or that it has simply supplanted the quasi-market, but rather that it has grown more effective as a reforming force of youth sector provision, conditioning the emergence of the youth sector beyond the terms of 'austerity'.
In the analysis below I trace the line of neoliberal reform from the expansionary quasi-marketisation of UK youth services to the post-2008 reforms of capital distributions, policy discourse, technologies of knowledge production, and institutional morphology at a national scale of organisation. I show that beyond the constraints of 'austerity', these latter reforms amount to the emergence of a new youth sector assemblage. ' We want to secure a modernised youth service…We have injected additional resources to make that happen. And with that fresh investment we expect to see reform' Charles Clarke, Former Secretary of State for Education and Skills in Transforming Youth Work, 2002 From the late 1990s, youth services in the UK underwent a period of neoliberal reform marked by the accelerated production of policy texts (DfEE 2001 , DCSF 2007 , DfES 2005 , 2006b . In common with education policy-making more generally, these reforms emphasised the use of competitive, quasi-market mechanisms to allocate resources (Whitty 1997, Whitty, Power, and Halpin 1998) including: i) a repositioning of the state as purchaser rather than provider of services (Bovaird 2014) , ii) the allocation of more capital through these market mechanisms, effecting a privatization of public service apparatus (Harris 2010) , iii) 'commodification' of services such that they could be quantified and valued within the market (Lyotard 1984) , and iv) the managerialist application of quality controls and audit as a means of control over decentralized 'autonomous' units of production (Ball 2003 , Ball 2007 .
Quasi-marketising reform
These amounted to expansionist reforms, with youth services scaled up through the allocation more funding to local authorities to spend on 'securing access' to services for young people aged 13-19.
(Figure 1)
Local authorities in receipt of these funds were required to 'create a market' based on 'competitive tendering processes ' (DfES 2006a, 16-17) where possible, rather than provide directly. The process of expanding provision was therefore privatizing in that it diverted public money to private organisations (typically not-for-profit), and commodifying in that it reconstituted grant funding (giving money to an organization for its stated aims with no direct exchange in mind) as the purchase of outputs. These The commodification of youth provision such that it could be traded in the market, involved its rearticulation as an input:output system in which 'value' corresponds to the ratio of resources expended for units supplied. This entailed a new distinction between 'universal' and 'targeted' youth services, with the latter prioritized because its pre-determined interventions with delineated categories of young people were easy to record in the form of outputs. 'Universal' provision by contrast encompasses open-ended relationships, dialogue and the creation of informal leisure spaces such as youth centres or clubs, wherein no such output can easily be determined in advance or even necessarily exists (Jeffs 2008 , Smith 1988 , Smith and Doyle 2002 .
Universal services remained a significant part of youth service delivery, such that government sought to reconstitute them as structured 'positive activities' (DfES 2005) that could be more easily defined and purchased. These moves recast Local Authorities introduced by the first New Labour government, were the most significant mechanism for the implementation of targets. PSAs were agreements between HM Treasury and 'delivery partners' including local authorities (HM Government 2008) , that established measureable outputs across a range of public service areas including youth services, and a related set of targets for delivery. Targets formed the basis for performance management, where they functioned as i) indicators of progress towards policy outcomes, and ii) as the basis of contract 'deliverables', holding Local Authorities and their suppliers to account. By including youth services in this centrally mandated targeting regime, the neoliberal regime found a means of specifying and regulating youth provision within decentralized systems of 'autonomous' providers, in similar fashion to other forms of education provision (Youdell 2006, 8) .
As in other areas of education, quasi-marketisation of youth services not only changed the mechanism by which resources were allocated but changed the 'product' itself. As a result, neoliberal youth service policy has been subject to consistent critique for its effects on provision, in spite of the rising levels of spending that accompanied it.
As small and medium sized voluntary sector providers of youth services increasingly contracted with the state, open-access provision gave way to fixed-term projects, based on pre-planned and structured activity, narrowly targeted at "excluded" or "hard to introduced 'rights' for any potential public service provider to demand a commissioning process be undertaken with respect to services currently provided by the state. Framed using the language of 'community' and 'civil society' and 'localism', this 'Community right to challenge' (DCLG 2011) empowers any private party to demand the privatization of public service supply. These rights extend to public sector staff, who gained the right to reconstitute themselves as an employee-owned 'mutual' company, potentially for-profit, and 'bid to take over the services they deliver' (HM Government 2011a, 42). Together, these changes mean that local authority spending on youth services is redistributed according to different aims, to different areas of service, and across a broader range of organisations.
Moreover, there has been the creation of significant new funding streams that bypass local authorities and local quasi-markets, captializing youth provision in different ways. The most prominent example is the UK Government's investment in the National Citizen Service (NCS), which was piloted in 2011. The annual budget for the 
The finance capital imaginary
Since the financial crash there has been a rapid, transnational rise of 'social investment' in policy discourse (Rees 2014) , that has been particularly pronounced in the UK (Bovaird 2014, 1-2). Indeed, former Prime Minister David Cameron understood the UK to be at the forefront of social investment as a policy export:
We've got a great idea here that can transform our societies, by using the power of finance to tackle the most difficult social problems…drug abuse, youth unemployment, homelessness and even global poverty. The potential for social investment is that big. So I want to make it a success in Britain and I want to sell it all over the world.
In 2013 In this finance capital imaginary, different signifiers articulate in the constitution of 'value'. 'Social investment' connects with 'return on investment', emphasising the importance of public services as producers of 'outcomes'. An outcome is typically a variable measured at a population level that can be articulated as the desirable result that should follow from the supply of the output (LSE Enterprise 2014, 8-9). Whereas outputs (typically a plural noun) are the direct result of the productive activity of the supplier, outcomes are longer term and/or of wider scale and not the result of any single productive activity (Harlock 2014, 5) . Outcomes are thus subject to a form of statistical causality; it would not generally be said that an output causes an outcome, but that a measurable change in a variable that serves as a proxy for an outcome might be predicted to follow the production of outputs. Such a measurable change is referred to as 'impact'. We found that for every £1 invested in the project, £7 of value is created for the state and the local community. A large proportion of this comes from savings to the victims of youth and gang violence that used to be common in the area. (Nevill and Poortvliet 2011, 6) As the pilot programme costs nearly £14.2m to government, the societal benefits are between one and two times the cost, showing a net benefit to UK society. The articulation of youth provision and its value in these terms connects organisations to the increasing amounts of capital distributed through 'impact investing' (Puttick and Ludlow 2012) , whether directly by central government or by social investment intermediaries. These changes to capital distribution and policy discourse production should be understood as yet another phase of 'steering' education provision through the structuring of a market (Ball and Gerwitz 1997, 207-208) , this time through the distinctive terms of finance capital.
Reforming the field of supply
In 1938, the UK government took its first significant step towards establishing a The NCS again provides a notable illustration of these trends, consisting of a fixed-term, structured intervention lasting just a few weeks, that engages young people in preparation for, planning and carrying out 'social action' in a community setting.
Youth social action is a notable example of a long tradition of youth provision that is Similar calculations of the financial value of long-term health benefits and increases in volunteering are also performed.
Conclusion
A new youth sector assemblage is emerging under the late neoliberal regime, central to which is a finance capital imaginary. The language of austerity that has framed many accounts of public policy since the financial crisis, including education policy, gives little scope to account for the productivity of neoliberal policy since the financial crisis.
I show how in this phase, late neoliberal policy making has constituted forces of reform, of disassembly and reassembly, of UK youth services through the reconstitution and redistribution of capital, policy texts and imaginaries, and organizational forms and practices.
Where neoliberalism had used the (quasi-)market for the efficient allocation of capital to services providing outputs, late neoliberalism establishes a futures market trading in outcomes. Where neoliberalism saw every £X purchasing a quantity of youth services places, late neoliberalism claims that every £X invested nets a return of £Y in the long run. The neoliberal regime had reduced the service of young people, like so much educational provision, to the production of a commodity to be consumed. Late neoliberalism reimagines commodity production as the creation of opportunities to invest. Where the quasi-market constituted the local offer with the young person as individual consumer, local authority as purchaser, and youth service as provider, late neoliberalism constitutes the outcome variable, its correlative impact variables, and an actuarial calculation of the value of impact in monetary terms.
In these austere times government no longer purchases, but invests; either directly or by stimulating private investment in services by promising a return as a fraction of the financial value of the impact on outcomes. Successful service delivery is increasingly that which can attract investment by constituting a credible relationship between service provision, impact on outcomes, and cost to the state in terms of services or welfare. These are the conditions of the emergence of a late neoliberal youth sector assemblage. i I refer specifically to England as, while austerity policy can reasonably be understood to apply to the UK as a whole, policy and regulation regarding youth services is, to a significant degree, devolved to the parliaments of individual nations.
ii These numbers are deliberately left unspecified as the methodology used, while providing a useful sense of the scale and rapidity of change, cannot provide specific numbers. First, the survey is based on survey responses by local authorities. A large number of authorities responded, but not all. As I explained late, given large and growing geographic variations in spending on youth services, it is not entirely safe to generalise from this sample to a wider population. Further, it is not clear if what is being referred to as youth service spending is consistent with definitions used in prior years.
iii This preference for targeted over even a consumer-oriented open-access 'local offer' is a pattern replicated in the cuts to children's services (NCB 2015) , suggesting a wider pattern of reform in late-neoliberal regulation.
